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Watching Me: The War on Crime,
Privacy, and the State
Kimberly D. Bailey∗
The war on crime exemplifies how the deprivation of privacy makes one
vulnerable to oppressive state social control. Scholars have severely
criticized the war on crime’s subordinating effects on poor urban people of
color. The role that privacy deprivation plays in this subordination,
however, has been under-theorized. This Article takes an initial step in
addressing this gap in the literature. It argues that one important reason
why the war on crime is so abusive is because it oppressively invades
individuals’ privacy; poor people of color have limited opportunities in the
creation of their life plans, participation in mainstream political discourse,
and access to social capital in part because they have limited privacy.
These privacy invasions also have an expressive aspect because they send
the message that the state does not trust these individuals to engage in
valued activities in legitimate ways; therefore, they must constantly be
watched. As a result, the deprivation of privacy also results in serious
dignitary harms. This Article further argues that current criminal justice
policies cannot even be justified on utilitarian grounds. Indeed, the privacy
invasions this Article describes contribute to counterproductive criminal
justice policies. While this Article focuses on poor people of color, it
cautions that they are the canary in the mine. Whites are also currently
experiencing serious privacy invasions in the form of mass surveillance
and DNA collection. The practices of harsh sentencing and overcharging
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are making them even more vulnerable to further privacy invasions. The
truth is that for all Americans, criminal justice policies are steadily
minimizing the line between the individual and the state.
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You busy watching me, watching me/That you’re blind baby, you
neglect to see/The drugs coming into my community/Weapons
coming into my community/Dirty cops in my community/And
you keep saying that I’m free/And you keep saying that I’m
free/And you keep saying that I’m free.1
Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner’s
canary: their distress is the first sign of a danger that threatens
us all.2
INTRODUCTION
Gloria is a middle-aged African-American woman who lives in a
housing project with her family. She is constantly aware of the
presence of the police. She always carries identification and a piece of
mail with her so that the police will not mistake her for someone who
is trespassing when she comes and goes from her housing project.
Although she is extroverted by nature, she also does not take the time
to make small talk with her neighbors in the project’s courtyard
because she wants to limit her potential exposure to the police. As it
is, she is stopped and questioned by the police on a regular basis. Her
husband, Charles, has made it a habit of always carrying a pay stub
from his employer with him because when he is stopped and
questioned by the police, they always intimate that he might be
earning his income in illegitimate ways.
Gloria and Charles only leave their apartment when it is necessary.
Although their teenage son, Alex, is a good kid who stays out of
trouble, Gloria and Charles also discourage him from spending much
time outside of their apartment in order to protect him from potential
police encounters. They also forbid Alex from wearing baggy clothes
and hoodies. Alex hates being cooped up inside their apartment, and
he resents the fact that he cannot dress in the way that he wants.
Charles, Gloria, and Alex do not know, however, that despite their
efforts the police already have Alex listed in a gang database. The
police once saw Alex talking with his friend, John, whom they
suspected of being involved in gang activity and drug trafficking.
Thus, Alex’s association with John led them to put him in their
database. The reason the police suspected John of being involved in
criminal activity is because his friend, Ben, “snitched” on him in order
to get himself out of some legal trouble. He was facing some hefty jail
1

JILL SCOTT, WATCHING ME (Hidden Beach Recordings 2000).
LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002).
2
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time for marijuana possession. In order to get probation, Ben provided
false information on John. The police later learned that Ben was lying
when they conducted a SWAT invasion of John’s home and found no
evidence of narcotics. Despite the police’s error, Alex’s and John’s
names are still in the gang database.3
Popular media and the academic community have heavily criticized
the war on crime, and particularly the war on drugs, as heavy-handed
and destructive.4 Specifically, the critique often focuses on the
subordinating effects that this war has had on poor urban
communities of color.5 The role of privacy deprivation in this
subordination, however, has been under-theorized. This Article takes
an initial step in addressing this gap in the literature. I argue that
because privacy makes an individual less vulnerable to oppressive
state social control, the deprivation of privacy can be an important
aspect of one’s subordination.
With respect to the war on crime, I intentionally paint with a broad
brush. Each of the tactics and privacy harms that I will describe merit
a much fuller analysis than I will be able to provide within the scope
of this one Article.6 By engaging in a more general analysis of the most
salient harms these tactics cause, my goal is two-fold. First, I describe
the breadth and pervasiveness of tactics used in the war on crime that
affect privacy. Second, I argue that because many poor people of color
experience some or all of these tactics simultaneously, the privacy
3
This is a fictionalized account based on actual cases and reports by poor urban
people of color about their experiences with the criminal justice system. See generally
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, STOP AND FRISK, THE HUMAN IMPACT: THE STORIES
BEHIND THE NUMBERS, THE EFFECTS ON OUR COMMUNITIES (July 2012), available at
http://stopandfrisk.org/the-human-impact-report.pdf (documenting interviews with
individuals routinely subjected to similar privacy invasions).
4
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 140-77 (2010); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY
OF JUSTICE 36-37 (2009); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
48-50 (2011); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 678-81 (1995); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of
Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 28-33 (2012);
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on
Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUS. 381, 383 (2002); Wendy
Ruderman, Rude or Polite, City’s Officers Leave Raw Feelings in Stops, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2012) [hereinafter Rude or Polite], http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/nyregion/newyork-police-leave-raw-feelings-in-stops.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
5
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 175-204; BUTLER, supra note 4, at 25-40; JEROME G.
MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
10 (2d ed. 2011); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 6, 102-19 (2009); STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 48, 272, 286.
6
I plan to engage in this broader project through several articles in the future.
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harms involved are an absolutely oppressive form of state abuse that
leads to a harsh form of state social control.7
To provide some background on the war on crime, Part I of this
Article will discuss its racialized origins. In Part II, I argue that the war
on crime exemplifies how the deprivation of privacy makes one
vulnerable to oppressive state social control. The state engages in an
unjustifiable privacy invasion whenever the monitoring of its citizens
results in the abuse of its power. This abuse can come in the form of
the prohibition of activities that society views as valuable; the creation
of a sense of being constantly monitored by the state, which then has a
chilling effect on these activities; or the unjustifiable aggregation of
data on the state’s citizens. The privacy invasions that result from
stops-and-frisks, motor stops, data aggregation through technology,
SWAT invasions, and snitching8 at minimum discourage or prohibit
poor people of color from freely engaging in self-determination, selfexpression, and freedom of association due to a fear of being
monitored, judged, and even unjustifiably punished. Furthermore, the
practices of overcharging and harsh sentencing make them vulnerable
to even further privacy invasions. In other words, one important
reason why the war on crime is so abusive is because it oppressively
invades individuals’ privacy — poor people of color have limited
opportunities in the creation of their life plans, participation in
mainstream political discourse, and access to social capital in part
because they have limited privacy.
These privacy invasions also have an expressive aspect because they
send the message that the state does not trust these individuals to
engage in valued activities in legitimate ways; therefore, they must
constantly be watched. The fact that these criminal justice tactics
disproportionately affect poor people of color also sends the message
that the state has less respect for them and values their identities and
viewpoints less than those of wealthier and white individuals, who are
afforded more privacy. Both of these messages result in dignitary harms.
Part III argues that not only are these tactics problematic from a moral
perspective, but it is also difficult to support them on utilitarian
7
For the purposes of this Article, I will not be focusing on the war on terror or
the use of the criminal justice system to curb immigration. Although both practices
also affect people of color, they each involve unique privacy concerns and state
interests. For this reason, I have opted to address them separately in future articles.
8
The term “snitching” does not refer to law-abiding citizens or victims who
report crimes to the police. Instead, it refers to the state practice of recruiting
individuals, often criminals themselves, to provide information to the government in
exchange for dropped charges, lenient sentences, money, or even drugs. See
discussion infra Part II.B.
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grounds. Some might argue that given the serious problem of violent
crime in poor neighborhoods of color, these privacy invasions by the
state are in fact justified. Evidence suggests, however, that many of the
tactics discussed in this Article are not decreasing crime.9 Furthermore,
the provision of more privacy by the state actually promotes more
effective criminal justice policy because, as an expression of respect, it
encourages compliance with the law and the type of strong informal
networks that are characteristic of communities with low crime rates.10
For these reasons, many of the practices discussed in this Article have
proven to be counterproductive. In addition, although mass surveillance
has the potential to deter crime, prevent wrongful convictions, and limit
racial profiling and police brutality,11 a serious analysis of the privacy
harms these practices cause is essential in determining under what
circumstances their law enforcement value outweighs privacy concerns.
Some of the tactics discussed in this Article are beginning to
threaten the privacy of whites in addition to those of color, including
data aggregation through technology. For this reason, poor people of
color appear to be the canary in the mine;12 the truth is that all
Americans should be concerned about the fact that these policies are
steadily diminishing the line between the individual and the state.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE WAR ON CRIME
A. The Drumbeats of War

The political rhetoric of law and order has racialized roots.13
Beginning in the mid-1950s, some segregationists labeled civil rights
activists as “law breakers” and argued that civil rights for African9

See discussion infra Part III.
See infra text accompanying notes 351-354.
11
See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 959, 960 (2013) [hereinafter Crime, Surveillance, and Communities].
12
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 2, at 11 (arguing that those who are racially
marginalized are “like the miner’s canary”). “Miners often carried a canary into the
mine . . . [because] [t]he canary’s more fragile respiratory system would cause it to
collapse from noxious gases long before humans were affected . . . . The canary’s
distress signaled that it was time to get out of the mine because the air was becoming
too poisonous to breathe.” Id.
13
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 40; Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on
Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 618-22 (2009). The contention that tough-on-crime
rhetoric has racialized roots is not meant to suggest, however, that all people of color
are against tough-on-crime policies. See Forman, supra note 4, at 36-44. Indeed, there
are African-Americans that view tougher criminal justice policies as a form of racial
justice. See id. at 42, 44.
10
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Americans would only lead to more crime.14 U.S. Representative John
Bell Williams once proclaimed:
This exodus of Negroes from the South, and their influx into
the great metropolitan centers of other areas of the Nation, has
been accompanied by a wave of crime. . . . What has civil
rights accomplished for these areas? . . . Segregation is the
only answer as most Americans — not the politicians — have
realized for hundreds of years.15
It is true that during the 1960s, the national crime rate soared.16
Increased crime, combined with the riots and uprisings that occurred
in the summer of 1964 and subsequent to the assassination of Martin
Luther King Jr. in 1968,17 allowed politicians to take advantage of the
fears, anxieties, and resentments of poor and working-class white
Americans.18 Barry Goldwater laid the foundation for the “get tough
on crime” movement during his 1964 presidential campaign when he
argued that continued leadership under President Lyndon B. Johnson’s
Administration would lead to “mobs in the street.”19
By 1968, 81% of respondents to the Gallup Poll agreed with the
statement that “law and order has broken down in the country”;20 the
majority blamed “Negroes who start riots” and “Communists.”21 That
14

See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41-42.
Id. at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16
“Reported street crime quadrupled in the twelve years from 1959 to 1971.
Homicide rates doubled between 1963 and 1974, and robbery rates tripled.” Forman,
supra note 4, at 35. But see ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41 (noting that while crimes
rates did increase during this period, the accuracy of the rates reported by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has been questioned).
17
The Kerner Commission determined that one of the major causes of this rioting
was police harassment and brutality. See I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
33 (2010) [hereinafter Rethinking the Fourth Amendment].
18
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 42-45. It should be noted that AfricanAmericans embraced tougher criminal justice policies, particularly in New York,
because increased crime in their neighborhoods alarmed them. See VANESSA BARKER,
THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY
AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 150-52 (2009). However, these activists tended not to
support harsh penalties against low-level dealers and addicts. See id. at 151.
19
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 41.
20
See id. at 45.
21
See id. While the civil rights movement was a chief cause of anxiety during this
period, “the economy, protests against the Vietnam war, political mobilization on
college campuses, the counter-culture movement generally, or a sense of social crisis
engendered for many by the demands for women’s and gay rights” also created an
anxiety about “social disorganization.” See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism:
15
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same year, Richard Nixon and George Wallace made “law and order” a
central theme of their presidential campaigns and they garnered 57%
of the vote.22 They specifically targeted civil rights activists in their
“law and order” campaign. After viewing one of his political ads that
made this targeting explicit, Nixon reportedly crowed that the ad “hits
it right on the nose. It’s all about those damn Negro-Puerto Rican
groups out there.”23
Claiming that illegal drugs were “public enemy number one,” Nixon
then declared a rhetorical “war on drugs” during his presidency that
did not propose any real changes in drug policy.24 President Reagan
later chimed in on this rhetoric, but he waged a war with more heft.25
When Reagan officially announced his war on drugs in October 1982,
less than 2% of the American public actually viewed drugs as the most
important issue facing the nation.26 Indeed, drug crimes were actually
declining in the nation at this point.27 A few years after his declaration,
however, Reagan’s administration was able to generate public support
for his effort due to the crack phenomenon. Deindustrialization and
globalization had devastated the job market for poor urban dwellers
with limited skills and education during the 1970s.28 When crack
arrived on urban streets around 1985, the current harsh economic
conditions made the sale of the drug an attractive way to make
money.29 As drug markets struggled to stabilize and anger due to the
high unemployment rate festered, violence spiked in the inner cities.30
The Reagan administration engaged in a media blitz, which
Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023,
1032 (2010).
22
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 46.
23
PHILIP A. KINKER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 292 (1999). Nixon also declared a war on the
welfare state: “[T]he ‘solution to the crime problem is not the quadrupling of funds for
any governmental war on poverty but more convictions.’” See KATHERINE BECKETT,
MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 38 (1997).
24
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 47.
25
See id. at 49.
26
See id. But see Nunn, supra note 4, at 389 (“Reagan’s declaration of war tapped
into a growing public sentiment against illegal drug use. Many citizens viewed drugs
as a menace and many of these same citizens were readily supportive of Reagan’s
proposals to address the drug problem.”).
27
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 7; see also Nunn, supra note 4, at 389.
28
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 49-50; Nunn, supra note 4, at 421.
29
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 50; see also Nunn, supra note 4, at 421.
Interestingly, although African-Americans constituted more than 80% of crack
defendants, they were only a minority of regular users. See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 184.
30
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 50-51.
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sensationalized the emergence of crack cocaine in poor, urban
neighborhoods.31 These efforts worked. By 1986, Newsweek
proclaimed that crack was the biggest story since Vietnam/Watergate;
Time named it the issue of the year.32 Furthermore, although whites
and African-Americans use illegal drugs at comparable rates,33 the
faces of the drug problem in the United States were the black “crack
whore,” the black “crack baby,” and the black “gangbanger.”34 Federal
budgets for federal law enforcement agencies soared during the
1980s.35 In contrast, budgets for agencies responsible for drug
prevention, treatment, and education plummeted.36
President George H.W. Bush continued the campaign and declared
that drug use was “the most pressing problem facing the nation.”37 By
1990, the New York Times/CBS News Poll reported that the number of
those who thought that drugs were the most significant problem in the
United States had increased to 64% of poll respondents.38
Democrats tried to convince the American public that they could be
even tougher on crime than Republicans.39 In 1965, President Johnson
delivered his first presidential address on crime and sent a legislative
anticrime agenda to Congress.40 While a presidential candidate, Bill
31

See id. at 49.
See id. at 51; Richard M. Smith, The Plague Among Us, NEWSWEEK, June 16,
1986, at 15.
33
See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 102; STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 272. Studies show
that white professionals may be the most likely of any group to use illegal drugs in
their lifetime. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 192.
34
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 51; see also Nunn, supra note 4, at 390 (arguing
that it was easy to construct African-Americans, Latinos, and other people of color as
the enemy of the war on drugs given the fact that the majority of white Americans
always viewed these individuals as the source of vice and crime).
35
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 49. Between 1980 and 1984, antidrug funding
increased from $8 million to $95 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See
id. Between 1981 and 1991, antidrug allocations increased from $33 million to $1,042
million for the Department of Defense and from $38 million to $181 million for the
Federal Bureau of Investigations. See id. During that same period, the Drug
Enforcement Agency’s spending grew from $86 million to $1,026 million. See id.
36
Between 1981 and 1984, the budget for the National Institute for Drug Abuse
decreased from $274 million to $57 million. See id. Funds allocated to the Department
of Education for antidrug efforts decreased from $14 million to $3 million. See id.
37
BECKETT, supra note 23, at 44.
38
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 54 (citing New York Times/CBS News Poll from
August of 1990).
39
See id. at 54-55.
40
See LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Special Message to the Congress on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice, in I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES:
LYNDON B. JOHNSON: CONTAINING THE PUBLIC MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF
32
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Clinton attended the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally
impaired African-American, and stated afterward, “I can be nicked a
lot, but no one can say I’m soft on crime.”41 Once elected, he endorsed
and signed a bill that imposed harsher sentencing42 and authorized
millions of dollars for state prison grants and the expansion of state
and local police forces.43 The Justice Policy Institute later observed
that “the Clinton Administration’s ‘tough on crime’ policies resulted in
the largest increases in federal and state prison inmates of any
president in American history.”44 Thus, both sides of the political aisle
have taken on an intense ferocity when it comes to their rhetoric and
actions regarding crime, and particularly illegal drugs.45
B. It’s a Numbers Game
While racial politics is one reason why the rhetoric regarding the
war on drugs has focused on African-Americans and Latinos, there is
also a more practical explanation why the war on the ground has
focused on these communities: the war on drugs is a numbers game;46
poor urban neighborhoods are the easiest places to increase arrest
numbers.47 The sale of drugs tends to be the most visible in poor
urban neighborhoods with low-level dealers on street corners.48 Poor
African-Americans and Latinos tend to be concentrated in these
THE PRESIDENT 1965, at 263-71 (1966); see

also López, supra note 21, at 1033.
Michael Kramer, Frying Them Isn’t the Answer, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 32; see
also López, supra note 21, at 1038 (arguing that Clinton’s “aggressive engagements
with crime and welfare during the 1990’s” was a way to pander to “white voters
through coded racial appeals”).
42
Specifically, the bill created dozens of new federal capital offenses and imposed
mandatory life sentences for some three-time offenders. See ALEXANDER, supra note 4,
at 55.
43
See id.
44
David Guard, Clinton Crime Agenda Shortsighted; May Hurt Poor and Minorities,
Advocates Say, STOP DRUG WAR.ORG (Apr. 15, 2008, 1:40 PM), http://stopthedrugwar.
org/trenches/2008/apr/15/clinton_crime_agenda_shortsighte.
45
See Nunn, supra note 4, at 390 (“For each anti-drug measure that passed, it
became necessary to further escalate the war so that no one, Democrat or Republican,
executive or legislative branch, could be called soft on this critical issue.”); see also
Gruber, supra note 13, at 618 (“[B]eing tough on crime has become a sure-win
platform on both sides of the political aisle.”). For a discussion about why the election
of Barack Obama as the first African-American president probably will not end the
mass incarceration of African-Americans and Latinos, see generally López, supra note
21, at 1068-73.
46
See BUTLER, supra note 4, at 93-94.
47
See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 54; see also BUTLER, supra note 4, at 93-94.
48
See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 54.
41

2014]

Watching Me

1549

neighborhoods;49 poor whites tend to be geographically dispersed.50 In
addition, abandoned, dilapidated buildings and houses in blighted
areas are havens for drug sales and drug users.51 In contrast, white
suburban drug use and sales can be more hidden.52
It is important to note that prior to the mid-1980s, the criminal
justice system was marginal to communities of color.53 While poor,
uneducated men of color have always had high and disproportionate
rates of incarceration, it was not until the end of the last century that
the exponential rate of incarceration made the penal system a
“dominant presence” in disadvantaged neighborhoods.54
Beginning with President Reagan’s term in office, the federal
government has offered millions of dollars to state and local agencies
willing to fight drug crimes.55 Many of the prolific specialized
narcotics task forces that exist throughout the country today are the
result of the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law
Enforcement Assistance Program.56 In order to convince the federal
government that they are putting the grant money to good use,
however, these task forces are under extreme pressure to keep their
arrest numbers up.57 Otherwise, the federal government will not renew
their grant money.58
Special forfeiture provisions also incentivize high arrest numbers
because the cash and assets that state and local law enforcement
agencies seize upon arrest become the property of those agencies
under revenue-sharing agreements with the federal government.59
49
See id.; George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty”: The
Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing
Rights, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1746, 1806 (2012).
50
See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 54.
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 183.
54
Id.
55
See id. at 72.
56
Id. The program is authorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 as amended
in 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-600, 102 Stat. 4329 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3750-55 (2012)).
57
See Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 82 (1998); see also United States v. Reese, 2
F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing the pressures experienced by members of an
Oakland Housing Authority police task force to maintain strong drug arrest numbers).
58
Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 57, at 82.
59
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 77; see also 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(2) (2012); 19
U.S.C. § 1616a(c) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (2012). For discussions about
how federal funding of the war on drugs and asset forfeiture provisions breed
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Criminal charges do not even have to be brought against the owners of
this property in order for agencies to keep it.60 Instead, the
government only has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the property was involved in a commission of a drug crime.61 The
owner of the property then has the burden to prove that she “did not
know of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture” or that she did “all
that reasonably could be expected under the circumstances to
terminate such use of the property.”62 Counsel is appointed only for
those individuals who have been formally charged with a crime,63 but
the vast majority of forfeiture cases involve individuals who have not
been charged with anything.64 Without an appointed attorney, many
choose not to challenge their forfeitures because the cost of an
attorney is often more than what their property is worth.65
Furthermore, individuals might fear that if they challenge a forfeiture
of their property, they will risk the chance that the government will
decide to file formal criminal charges in retaliation.66 For these
reasons, up to 90% of forfeiture cases are not challenged in some
jurisdictions.67
Given the financial stakes involved, drug offenders in poor, inner
city communities arguably are the most logical targets of the war on
drugs. If federal grant money incentivizes high arrest rates, then the
police will focus on communities where they can increase their
numbers with the lowest amount of effort.68 Moreover, special
forfeiture provisions also incentivize high arrest rates and an intense
focus on those who cannot afford to challenge the seizure of their
assets.

corruption in police departments, see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 80-81; Ted
Conover, A Snitch’s Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/01/magazine/alex-white-professional-snitch.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.
60
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 81. Women in relationships with men suspected
of drug crimes are the most frequent claimants in forfeiture proceedings. See id.
61
See 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2012).
62
Id. § 983(d)(2)(A).
63
See id. § 983 (b)(1)(A).
64
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 81.
65
See id. at 81-82.
66
See id.
67
Id. at 82.
68
See Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities
in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 122 (2006) [hereinafter Race, Drugs,
and Policing] (finding “some evidence that law enforcement’s focus on outdoor drug
venues does contribute to racial disparity in drug arrests”).
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C. Racial Stereotypes
The higher visibility of drug sales in poor, urban neighborhoods is
probably not the only reason that poor African-Americans and Latinos
have been the focus of the war on drugs. Scholars have noted that
“there has always been a racial dimension to American drug policy.”69
Anxiety about Chinese immigrants in the mid-1870s led to the first
national campaign against narcotics, specifically opium.70 The
perceived threat of African-Americans after Reconstruction led to the
nation’s first drug criminalization statute, which made cocaine
illegal.71 During the 1920s, marijuana and Mexican-Americans, who
were viewed as a labor threat, became the focus of laws in the western
states.72 During all of these campaigns, racist stereotypes justified the
focus on people of color.73
Similarly, empirical research suggests that the stereotypes regarding
crack dealers, crack babies, and crack whores not only affect the
public perception of the drug problem, but they also affect the
discretionary decisions of law enforcement.74 One study found that the
Seattle Police Department ignored reports of outdoor activity in
predominately white areas of Seattle, and with respect to racially
mixed open-air markets, African-American dealers were far more
likely to be arrested than whites.75 The police also devoted their
resources to open-air markets in the precinct that was the least likely
69
See Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Possession Arrests, and the Question of
Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 424 (2005) [hereinafter Drug Use];
Nunn, supra note 4, at 412.
70
See Nunn, supra note 4, at 413.
71
See id. at 415-16.
72
See id. at 416-17.
73
Because a significant number of Chinese-Americans used opium, the focus on
opium created a justification to harass them. See id. at 413-14. Furthermore, “[i]t was
widely believe[d] that Chinese opium dens would entrap virtuous white women who
would then be available to have sex with Asian men.” Id. at 414. After the
Reconstruction, whites believed that cocaine fortified African-Americans for criminal
activities. See id. at 415. Whites were particularly fearful that African-Americans
would forget their place, become violent, and rape white women. See id. at 415-16.
During the 1920s, whites believed that marijuana “encouraged Chicanos to commit
crimes and become more violent and dangerous.” Id. at 417.
74
See Beckett et al., Drug Use, supra note 69, at 436 (concluding that the Seattle
Police Department’s decision to focus on crack and outdoor markets in the downtown
area was based on a “racialized conception of ‘the drug problem’”); see also Nunn,
supra note 4, at 382 (“In the minds of the criminal justice system’s managers, planners
and workers, drugs are frequently associated with African American citizens and their
communities.”).
75
See Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 68, at 129-30.
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to be identified by citizen complaints as having suspected drug
activity.76 In other words, they were not focusing on these open-air
markets because citizens were asking them to focus on these markets.
Indeed, Seattle residents were far more likely to report suspected drug
activity indoors and not in open-air markets,77 but just as was the case
with open-air arrests, African-American dealers were overrepresented
in indoor sale arrests.78 Most importantly, the police department
focused on crack, which is more likely sold by African-Americans,
even though local hospital records indicated that more overdose
deaths were caused by heroin, which is predominately injected by
whites,79 than by crack and powder cocaine combined.80 The authors
ultimately concluded that law enforcement’s focus on crack was an
important cause for the disproportionate rate of African-Americans
arrested for drug delivery.81 They also concluded that the focus on
crack was the primary cause of racial disparity in drug possession
arrests in Seattle.82 Specifically, law enforcement focused on AfricanAmerican and Latino users.83 Regardless of whether it is conscious or
subconscious,84 just as it has in the past, race and racial stereotypes
appear to play a role in current drug and criminal justice policy.
II.

THE WAR ON CRIME AND PRIVACY

Several scholars have documented how the war on crime has had
subordinating effects on poor people of color.85 In this Part, I will
76

See id. at 126.
See id.
78
Id. at 122.
79
See Beckett et al., Drug Use, supra note 69, at 425, 434.
80
See id. at 434.
81
Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 68, at 119.
82
Beckett et al., Drug Use, supra note 69, at 436.
83
Id.
84
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 12-15 (arguing that racial indifference, rather
than racial hostility or overt bigotry, has led to a criminal justice system that has
replaced Jim Crow as the American racial caste system); Nunn, supra note 4, at 44041, 445 (arguing that the criminal justice system is the foundation for racist attitudes
and behaviors and that African-Americans and other people of color serve as a “pool
of surplus criminality” in American society in that they are a criminal class ever ready
to be blamed during times of national crisis); Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When
Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 95-98 (2001) (arguing that
“hyper-incarceration” has replaced the ghetto as an institution of social control over
under-skilled African-American men).
85
See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 20-57 (defining the current criminal
justice system as the “new Jim Crow”); William H. Buckman & John Lamberth,
Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow on the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
77
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discuss some of the most prevalent tactics used in the war on crime
and argue that the fact that these tactics actually deprive individuals of
privacy is an important, and often overlooked, aspect of this
subordination. In fact, the war on crime exemplifies how the
deprivation of privacy makes one vulnerable to oppressive state social
control. The constant monitoring of poor people of color by the state
at minimum has a chilling effect on their willingness to engage in selfdetermination, self-expression, and freedom of association. In
contrast, privacy enhances an individual’s ability to engage freely in
these activities that society views as valuable86 in part because they
provide a check against overly oppressive social control. The state’s
provision of individual privacy also has an expressive aspect in that it
is a demonstration of respect; when the state provides privacy, it sends
the implicit message that the individual is “worthy” of and can be
trusted with engaging in essential traits of personhood.87
A. What Is Privacy?
The concept of privacy is multi-faceted and covers a wide variety of
contexts. There is the physical aspect of privacy, which concerns
limiting physical invasions on a person or her property.88 There is the
emotional aspect of privacy, which concerns protecting the integrity of
intimate relationships.89 There is also the personal aspect of privacy,
RTS. L. REV. 387, 387-88 (2001); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow,
63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 723 (2000).
86
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.2 (1967) (noting that privacy is
foundational to many constitutional rights because “[v]irtually every governmental
action interferes with personal privacy to some degree”); see also Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088-93 (2002) [hereinafter
Conceptualizing Privacy] (defining privacy as a “general term that refers to the
practices we want to protect and to the protections against disruptions to these
practices”).
87
According to Anita Allen, “[t]o be a person in the moral sense is to possess
traits in virtue of which one is entitled to a high standard of treatment and to be held
to a high standard of conduct.” ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN
A FREE SOCIETY 43 (1988). According to Anglo-American ethicists in the Kantian
tradition, “[s]elf consciousness, free-will, rationality, moral agency, and the ability to
form life plans are essential traits of personhood.” Id. Privacy creates, sustains, and
enhances personhood because it provides individuals with the space to develop these
traits. See id. at 44.
88
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
of “persons, houses, papers, and effects”).
89
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (determining
that the marital relationship is “within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees”).
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which concerns autonomy in decision-making.90 All of these aspects
share “family resemblances” to one another, yet they all also involve
distinct activities and harms.91 Furthermore, my description of these
three particular aspects of privacy is incomplete. An attempt to
provide a universal definition that covers all aspects of privacy would
prove futile because the activities and potential harms at stake depend
on the context surrounding a specific privacy invasion.92
In the criminal justice context, the state engages in an unjustifiable
privacy invasion whenever the monitoring of its citizens results in the
abuse of its power. This abuse can come in the form of the prohibition
of activities that society views as valuable; the creation of a sense of
being constantly monitored by the state, which then has a chilling
effect on these activities; or the unjustifiable aggregation of data on the
state’s citizens. These abuses result in serious dignitary harms because
of the level of suspicion and distrust they thrust upon the individual.
According to Anglo-American ethicists in the Kantian tradition,
“[s]elf consciousness, free-will, rationality, moral agency, and the
ability to form life plans are essential traits of personhood.”93 Privacy
creates, sustains, and enhances personhood because it provides
individuals with the space to develop these traits94 without the fear of
being monitored, judged, and sometimes even unjustifiably punished.
The war on crime creates such an oppressive feeling of being watched
by the state, that it at minimum has a chilling effect on poor people of
color’s self-determination, self-expression, and freedom of association.
Self-determination enables an individual to create the life that one
wants to create. Self-expression and freedom of association allow for
the free exchange of ideas and experimentation with one’s identity,
which are both important for self-development. They also make it
easier for one’s ideas and cultural identity to become part of
mainstream political discourse. In addition, freedom of association,
particularly with a diverse group of people, increases a poor person of
color’s social capital and chances for upward mobility.95

90
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending the right to privacy
to the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy).
91
See Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 86, at 1096-99.
92
See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480-81
(2006); Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 86, at 1088-93.
93
ALLEN, supra note 87, at 43.
94
See id. at 44.
95
See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 23 (arguing that
racial segregation limits access to the types of informal social networks that increase
the likelihood of upward mobility).
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Because privacy is the foundation for freedoms that enable the
creation of one’s identity and life plans, the more privacy one has, the
less vulnerable he is to oppressive state social control.96 For this
reason, the level of privacy granted by the state has historically tracked
the level of one’s political power and status.97 Wealthy, white men
historically have had the greatest amount of privacy; women, the poor,
and people of color have had the least amount of privacy, and,
therefore, they have been vulnerable to more severe policies of state
social control.98 For example, there was a time when women had to
adhere to certain standards of sexual and reproductive conduct in
order to be entitled to welfare benefits.99 Eligibility for Aid to
Dependent Children was based on “suitable-home or ‘man-in-thehouse’ rules.”100
Scholars have documented the fact that the poor and people of color
continue to have the least amount of privacy in our society and,
therefore, they are still the most vulnerable to more extreme state
social control policies.101 Some argue that welfare is still a means of
regulating the sexual behavior of many poor, single women.102 Indeed,
many women currently must participate in mandatory paternity
proceedings in order to be entitled to benefits, and many jurisdictions
96

See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989).
See Kimberly D. Bailey, It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1777, 1803-04 (2012); Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”:
Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 177-78 (2002).
98
See sources cited supra note 97.
99
See Dorothy Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 941-42 (1995) [hereinafter Unconstitutional
Conditions].
100
See id.
101
See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 191
(1995); Annette Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 683, 770 (2001); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 118-34 (2011); Dorothy Roberts, The Dialectic of Privacy
and Punishment in the Gendered Regulation of Parenting, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 191, 194
(2009); Roberts, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 99, at 941; Dorothy Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1469-70 (1991); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual
Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 121, 125 (2002).
102
See Janet Simmonds, Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in Welfare
Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive Capacity, and Terms of Probation, 17 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 276-81 (2006) (arguing that family cap programs that limit the
receipt of welfare benefits for certain children in several states is a type of social
control that infringes on women’s reproductive rights).
97
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impose family caps, which limit cash benefit increases for any children
conceived while the mother is receiving welfare benefits.103 Recipients
of state funded prenatal care often have to endure highly embarrassing
and intrusive questions about their parenting history, criminal history,
immigration status, contraceptive use, and finances, which middleand upper-class women simply do not have to endure.104 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has held that welfare recipients are not entitled to
Fourth Amendment rights when it comes to searches in their
homes.105 Social workers can stop by and search a recipient’s home
and interview her with no warning or warrant. As will be discussed
more fully below, the privacy invasions that result from current
criminal justice policies also contribute to greater social control of
poor people of color because of the chilling effects they have on selfdetermination, freedom of association, and freedom of expression.
In addition to making poor people of color more vulnerable to
oppressive state social control, the war on crime has also created
serious dignitary harms. When the state curtails privacy, it sends a
powerful message: an individual cannot be trusted to use his privacy
in legitimate ways.106 For example, parents tend to give their children
less privacy because they do not yet trust that the children have the
maturity and wisdom not to make choices that could potentially harm
themselves or others. Likewise, one reason we limit the privacy of
prisoners is because their past acts suggest that we cannot trust them
not to engage in criminal and potentially dangerous activities, at least
for a set period of time. The lack of trust expressed by the state
through the war on crime, therefore, at best resembles a form of
paternalism; at worst, it resembles a form de facto criminalization of
individuals simply because they are poor and of color.107 These
individuals logically conclude that the state does not respect them nor

103

See id.; Smith, supra note 101, at 123, 174.
Bridges, supra note 101, at 118-34.
105
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
106
Cf. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1784 (1994) (“A
government-citizen metaphor in the context of the Fourth Amendment is consistent
with the Court’s recognition in cases such as Brown and Loving that rights are not
simply enclaves of protection from government interference but also affect the
citizen’s view of his or her role in society.”).
107
One man interviewed by the Center for Constitutional Rights actually described
the militarization of his neighborhood by the police as an “outside prison.” CTR. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 19.
104
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does it view their identities and viewpoints as equal to those of white
and wealthier citizens.108
B. The War on Crime’s Impact on Individual Privacy
1.

Stops-and-Frisks and Motor Stops

The myopic focus of the war on drugs on arrest and conviction
rates, combined with the racialized view of illegal drug use, creates an
environment where police officers feel free to subject poor urban
African-Americans and Latinos to intrusive stops-and-frisks on a daily
basis.109 In 2011, 84% of stops-and-frisks conducted in New York were
on African-Americans and Latinos.110 Eighty-eight percent of these
stops did not result in an arrest or a summons being given.111
Contraband was found in only 2% of these stops.112 In other words,
although the vast majority of residents of poor urban neighborhoods
are law-abiding citizens, many of them still have to tolerate these
intrusions.113 Indeed, particularly for young, African-American and
Latino males, they are a regular part of life.114 For example, between
January 2006 and March 2010, the police stopped 52,000 individuals
in an eight-block minority area in Brooklyn.115 This amounted to an
average of one stop per resident per year.116 The average increased to
five stops per person for males fifteen to thirty-four years of age.117
Some of those who have been stopped by the New York Police
Department describe a hornet-like invasion where they are barraged
with questions such as “where’s the weed?” and “where’s the guns?”118
These exchanges are sometimes laced with profanity, racial epithets,

108

See id. at 11, 14; see also Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note
17, at 47-48.
109
See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 3.
110
In 2010, Blacks made up 23% of New York City’s population; Latinos made up
29% of the population. See id. at 27 n.2.
111
Id. at 27 n.3.
112
Id. at 27 n.4.
113
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 69.
114
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17-22.
115
Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
2010, at A1. Approximately 14,000 residents lived in this area. Id.
116
Less than 1% of the stops resulted in arrest. Only twenty-five firearms were
recovered during these stops. Id.
117
Id.
118
Ruderman, Rude or Polite, supra note 4.
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and name-calling like “immigrant,” “old man,” or “bro.”119 Other
exchanges are more polite where the police officer asks whether they
can talk with the individual; asks him a series of questions such as
what he is doing, where he lives, and whether he has anything on him;
and then lets the individual go.120 In either type of exchange, the
subjects of these stops often report “feeling intruded upon and
humiliated.”121 A college student from Brooklyn describes, “‘They talk
to you like you’re ignorant, like you’re an animal.’”122 Another man
from Queens describes feeling “belittled,” even though he once
experienced a more polite exchange.123 Individuals often feel shame
after these interactions and fear that others who witness the stop-andfrisk will assume that they are criminals.124 Even young children are
not immune from this practice. One New Yorker reporters,
There’s a junior high school [where] almost all the kids are
either of Arabic [sic] descent or Latino. There [were] days
when you’d see all these little kids lined up, with their legs
spread, holding [onto] the wall, and the cops are going
through their pockets and stuff. It’s just like a terrible,
disgusting, horrible thing to see.125
Furthermore, police often engage in abusive and inappropriate
behaviors via the stop-and-frisk including forcibly stripping
individuals down to their underclothing in public, “inappropriate
touching, physical violence and threats, extortion of sex, sexual
harassment and other humiliating and degrading treatment.”126
Objecting to inappropriate touching can lead to a charge of resisting
arrest.127
What is most striking about this practice is that residents of
particular communities have had to modify their everyday activities in
order to lessen the risk associated with police encounters.128 New
Yorkers of color describe refraining from wearing stereotypical
“ethnic” clothing and hair styles to make themselves less likely to be
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 6.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See id. at 17.

2014]

Watching Me

1559

accosted by the police.129 They also describe taking public
transportation and avoiding walking altogether to avoid encounters
with law enforcement on the street.130 Others describe how young
people have to stay indoors and cannot play outside.131 Adults feel like
they cannot sit on the porch or go to the store or interact with their
neighbors.132
The police have particularly focused on public housing sites for
heightened surveillance,133 but the city of New York also has a special
program, Operation Clean Halls, which involves private buildings.134
Under this program, owners of private buildings sign contracts with the
New York Police Department, which allows the police to patrol these
buildings.135 African-Americans and Latinos are disproportionately
stopped by police as part of this program.136
In order to avoid the accusation of trespassing, many New Yorkers
report always carrying identification or a piece of mail verifying that
they live in a particular building.137 Some report that residents of a
building may even have to produce a lease in order to avoid arrest.138
For many, they daily must endure police inquiries of, “Do you live
here?”139 New Yorkers report that they also carry pay stubs to prove
that they have a legitimate source of income.140
In Chicago, police cars patrol public housing projects and when
they stop, every young African-American man in the area
automatically places his hands against the car and spreads his legs to
be searched.141 This automatic reflex to “assume the position” happens
129

Id. at 7. One woman laments, “It got to the point where I have agreed to myself
not to get any ethnic hairdos for a while . . . because I have been harassed by the
police while wearing hair like in dreadlocks or cornrows.” Id. at 28 n.34.
130
Id. at 18.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 19; see Rivera et al., supra note 115, at A1 (noting that a broken lock on a
housing project building can lead to anyone who enters that building being stopped as
a potential trespasser).
134
See Colleen Long, NYPD Operation Clean Halls Challenged in Court; Program
Allows Police Inside Private Buildings, HUFF. POST (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/nypd-operation-clean-halls_n_2852097.html.
135
See id.
136
In 2012, 55% of those stopped were black, 32% were Hispanic, and 10% were
white. Id.
137
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17.
138
Id. at 19.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 17.
141
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 122-23.
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in poor communities of color across the nation,142 and it underscores
how constant police presence and surveillance have become woven
into the everyday fabric of poor, urban life. It is not surprising,
therefore, that residents in these communities describe this constant
presence as a type of “military occupation”143 or “outside prison.”144
A variation of the stop-and-frisk is the “stop-and-sniff.” New York
police officers will stop individuals drinking from cups in public.145
They then ask to sniff the contents of the individual’s cup to see if it
contains alcohol.146 If it smells like alcohol, they are issued a summons
for public drinking.147 The penalty for the offense is small at twentyfive dollars per ticket, but the real purpose for these stops is to have an
excuse to check to see if an individual has any outstanding warrants.148
As is the case with stop-and-frisk practices, residents are angry and
resentful when police officers demand to sniff the contents of their
cups.149 Furthermore, one judge found that 85% of the summonses
that were issued during one month in Brooklyn were to AfricanAmericans and Latinos.150
Just as is the case with stops-and-frisks, motor vehicle stops are a
numbers game.151 As a result, tens of thousands of innocent
individuals are pulled over every year as part of the war on drugs.152
Unfortunately, a disproportionate number of these individuals are
African-American and Latino.153 Indeed, many are familiar with the
terms “driving while black” or “driving while brown,” which refer to
the disproportionate effects of traffic stops on African-Americans and
Latinos.154 Some New Yorkers report that they avoid driving altogether

142

See id. at 122.
Id. at 122-23; CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 19.
144
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 19.
145
Joseph Goldstein, Sniff Test Does Not Prove Public Drinking, a Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A32 [hereinafter Sniff Test].
146
See id.; see also Rivera et al., supra note 115, at A1 (describing an incident where
twenty police officers surrounded a man because he refused to let an officer smell the
contents of his orange juice container).
147
See Goldstein, Sniff Test, supra note 145, at A32.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See People v. Figueroa, 948 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
151
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 70 (quoting a California police officer as
confirming, “You’ve got to kiss a lot of frogs before you find a prince”).
152
See id.
153
See id.
154
See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 16-17; Nunn,
supra note 4, at 401.
143
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and opt for public transportation in order to avoid these
confrontations.155
The current state of Fourth Amendment law legitimates these stops.
Under Terry v. Ohio, a police officer may stop a person if he has
reasonable suspicion that a crime is afoot.156 The Supreme Court did
not take great pains to define “reasonable suspicion” other than to
state that it has to be something more than just a “hunch.”157 A police
officer has to be able to articulate specific reasonable inferences drawn
“from the facts in light of his experience.”158 Once a police officer has
stopped an individual under reasonable suspicion, he also may
conduct a frisk if he reasonably believes that the person may have a
weapon that could potentially harm the officer.159 The Court’s
rationale behind Terry was to balance law enforcement’s interest in
investigating and preventing potential crimes with an individual’s
Fourth Amendment right to not be subject to unreasonable searches
and seizures.160 Its holding also was intended to minimize the
potential safety risks police officers face during the pursuit of their
duties.161 Although Terry provides law enforcement with a great deal
of discretion, there are still cases where the police abuse or outright
violate it.162 Moreover, a police officer does not even need to rely upon
Terry if an individual consents to answer his questions or to be
searched.163 Most individuals do not feel free not to give such consent,
especially if they are poor or of color.164

155

See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 18.
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
157
See id. at 27.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See id. at 19-22.
161
See id. at 23-24.
162
It has been documented that as recently as 2010, some New York Police
Department officers “were under the mistaken impression that they ‘were entitled to
stop and question anyone inside’ public housing.” Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals
Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Prosecutor
Deals Blow].
163
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
164
See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 21 (“In short,
the law-abiding minority is likely to feel less able to claim or assert [the right to refuse
to consent to a search].”); Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters” Some
Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL.
U. L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1991) (“Common sense teaches that most of us do not have
the chutzpuh or stupidity to tell a police officer to ‘get lost’ after he has stopped us and
asked for identification or questioned us about possible criminal conduct.”).
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With respect to traffic stops, the Supreme Court has approved the
use of these stops as a pretext for drug investigations; as long as a
motorist has actually violated a traffic law, the police may stop him,
even if their actual motivation is to search him for drugs.165 Indeed,
under the federal program Operation Pipeline, local and state agencies
are trained on how to use a minor traffic violation as a pretext for drug
searches.166 Once a traffic stop is made, an officer may ask the motorist
to consent to a search of his vehicle.167 In some cases, a person’s car is
literally torn apart.168 In most cases, a motorist will feel that he has no
choice but to consent to this type of search;169 the Supreme Court has
refused to require the police to inform motorists of their right not to
consent.170 Operation Pipeline, in fact, trains officers on how to get
consent from reluctant motorists.171 If a motorist does refuse to
consent, the police may also opt to bring a drug-sniffing dog to the
scene. Under these circumstances, the police do not even need the
motorist’s permission to use the dog because a dog sniff of one’s car in
a public area is not considered a “search,” and it therefore does not
trigger Fourth Amendment protection.172
It is important to stress just how intrusive stops-and-frisks and
motor stops are; they are more than just minor annoyances. Many
individuals, particularly young men of color, must endure these stops
monthly, weekly, and sometimes even daily.173 The intensity and
frequency of these stops makes these individuals feel as if they are
constantly being watched by the state. As a result, some inner-city
residents of New York have reported that they limit the amount of
time that they spend on the street and that they go outside only when
necessary in order to mitigate constant monitoring by the police and
to maintain some sense of anonymity from the state.174 This limitation
on their mobility necessarily undermines their ability to create the
types of lives that they want to create through self-determination. This
165

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996).
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 69.
167
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996).
168
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 70.
169
See Maclin, supra note 164, at 249-50.
170
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
171
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 69; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN., Operations Pipeline and Convoy (Nov. 2009), https://web.archive.org/web/
20091130185156/http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/pipecon.htm.
172
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
173
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 17-19; see ALEXANDER, supra
note 4, at 124-25.
174
See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
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limitation also has a chilling effect on their associations with their
neighbors,175 and it makes associations with those outside of their
neighborhood, particularly those who are of other races, very
difficult.176 In addition, the fact that some poor people of color feel the
need to look less “ethnic” in order to avoid being a target for constant
monitoring, because of racial and socioeconomic biases,177 shows that
the war on crime has led some to severely limit their sense of selfexpression out of desire to keep some of their privacy. This fact is
significant because how one dresses and how one wears one’s hair are
important expressions of one’s personal and cultural identity.178
Freedom of association and expression are important aspects of selfdevelopment because they allow for the free exchange of ideas and
experimentation with one’s identity. These freedoms also enable
minority viewpoints and cultural identities to become part of
mainstream political discourse. In addition, it has been documented
that residential racial segregation limits the access that people of color
have to the types of informal social networks that increase the
likelihood of upward mobility.179
These stops are also problematic because this constant barrage of
questioning regarding one’s activities and comings and goings
expresses the lack of trust that the state has for poor people of color. It
does not matter that innocent individuals do not have anything to
hide,180 this lack of trust shows a suspicion that these individuals need
to be constantly watched in order to keep them in line. The fact that
this sentiment is often expressed in a public setting intensifies the
insult to their dignity because these individuals must bear the shame
that others might assume that the stops confirm that poor people of
color must always be watched. Furthermore, the fact that white and

175

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 27 (arguing that
the heightened surveillance of individuals in neighborhoods “racially incongruent”
from themselves by the police reifies residential segregation).
177
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
178
For an analysis of the economic, physical, and psychological costs to AfricanAmerican women when they attempt to conform their natural hair to white American
norms, see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of
Analysis Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1110-20 (2010).
179
See also I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
43, 49-52 (2009).
180
But see Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings
of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 772 (2007) (arguing that the “I’ve got nothing to
hide” argument against more robust privacy protections does not address all of the
problems that a lack of privacy potentially creates).
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wealthier individuals do not have to endure these stops with the
frequency that poor people of color do expresses that whites and
wealthier individuals are worthy of more privacy, and, therefore, more
trust and respect.
This indignity is further heightened by the fact that most individuals
do not feel free to speak out against these stops-and-frisks.181 Refusal
of consent to a search or speech against an officer’s actions could
potentially result in retaliation in the form of a resisting arrest charge,
physical violence, or future harassment.182 For this reason, most
individuals opt to endure this treatment in silence. Silence, however,
can often make one feel complicit in his subordination.183 In other
words, it can make one feel like he is agreeing with the state that it has
to monitor his constant movements. This feeling leads to further
feelings of shame, anger, and resentment, particularly if one is being
dressed down in front of others, including one’s children.
In addition, the fact that the state does not appear to be concerned
about the chilling effect that these privacy invasions have on selfdetermination, self-expression, and freedom of association suggests
that minority viewpoints and identities are less worthy of recognition.
For example, criminal justice policies that discourage an AfricanAmerican woman from wearing her hair in braids or clothing that is
viewed as stereotypically “black,” because the state actors following
those policies tend to focus on women who choose to express
themselves in these ways, send the message that “ethnic” identities are
undesirable.184 Furthermore, if these practices discourage her from
venturing beyond her neighborhood or even her home, the state is
expressing that she “belongs” in the poor, segregated neighborhood
where she resides and nowhere else.
There is also a strange paradox that is occurring surrounding the
home. Both rhetorically and constitutionally speaking, the home has
been particularly revered as a place where one is entitled to the utmost
privacy.185 Even during the era of Prohibition, the law gave homes
181
Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 22; Maclin, supra
note 164, at 249-50.
182
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 5.
183
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Paradox of Silence: Some Questions About Silence as
Resistance, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343, 355-56 (2000).
184
The number of women stopped by police in New York in 2011 represented
6.9% of all stops. Wendy Ruderman, For Women in Street Stops, Deeper Humiliation,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at A1.
185
See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[P]rivacy and security in the home are
central to the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees as explained in our decisions and as
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special protection.186 In fact, the Volstead Act only covered alcohol
sales in the home, not alcohol served to guests or kept for personal
consumption.187 Furthermore, the Act imposed criminal sanctions
against any law enforcement officer who conducted unlawful searches
in the home.188
On the one hand, stops-and-frisks on the street do not infringe upon
the privacy that one enjoys in one’s home. Indeed, it seems that some
poor people of color are retreating and staying in their homes in order
to have some semblance of privacy.189 Yet because some anonymity in
public space is essential for a greater amount of freedom of selfdetermination, self-expression, and freedom of association, privacy
solely in the home is inadequate to fully engage in these freedoms.
Stops-and-frisks, however, do not even give poor people of color
unfettered access to privacy in their homes. It is quite significant that
many inner-city residents, particularly those who live in public
housing, must endure stops-and-frisks and general police harassment
right outside of their homes or within the hallways of their apartment
buildings.190 Given the significance that the home has in our culture, it
is downright demoralizing that poor individuals of color have to carry
identification or mail to prove that they actually live where they claim
that they live or have to carry a pay stub to prove that they make
money in a legitimate way.191 Even though the home arguably can
provide a respite from the state’s eyes, some individuals first have to
let the state take a quick peek into their lives in order to prove that
they have a right to gain access to the threshold of that respite.
understood since the beginnings of the Republic.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.
103, 115 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘[I]t is beyond dispute that the home is
entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people.’” (quoting
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (“The Fourth Amendment protects the
individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual’s home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional
terms . . . .”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“The Fourth
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very
core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”).
186
STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 180-81; Hafetz, supra note 97, at 176, 200.
187
STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 180-81; Hafetz, supra note 97, at 200.
188
Hafetz, supra note 97, at 200.
189
See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.
190
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 18-19; see Goldstein,
Prosecutor Deals Blow, supra note 162, at A1.
191
See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
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Technology and Data Aggregation

Another troubling aspect of the war on crime is the practice of data
collection through technology. One example of this is the creation of
gang databases throughout the country. Not only do the police subject
young African-American and Latino males to constant stops-and-frisks
and harassment, but they also often use these stops to gather
information about them to put into a database.192 This information can
include monikers, tattoos, names of associates, schools attended, home
addresses, and photographs.193 While the police are purportedly
recording the information of only suspected gang members, the criteria
for determining membership or association with a gang is highly
subjective and often based on racial and ethnic stereotypes regarding
the clothing, tattoos, and music choices believed to be associated with
gangs.194 For example, in Denver, a young person can get entered into
the database by displaying any two of a list of attributes, which include,
“slang, ‘clothing of a particular color,’ pagers, hairstyles, or jewelry.”195
It was revealed in November 1993 that Denver had compiled a list of
6,500 “suspected” gang members.196 Though African-Americans
accounted for less than 5% of Denver’s population, they accounted for
57% of those on the list.197 What is most stunning is that well over twothirds of all African-American youths and young men between the ages
of twelve and twenty who lived in Denver were on the list.198 Latinos
accounted for another one-third of the list; whites, who represented
80% of Denver’s population, only accounted for fewer than 7% on the
list.199 In Los Angeles, mass stops of African-American males led to the
creation of a database that had their names, addresses, and other
biographical information.200 This practice was so prevalent that the
database contained information on nearly half of all young, African192
Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as SelfInvention, 42 UC DAVIS L. REV. 79, 125-26 (2009).
193
Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R.
& C.L. 115, 121 (2005).
194
See ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 133; Mitnick, supra note 192, at 125-26; Wright,
supra note 193, at 127.
195
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 133.
196
MILLER, supra note 5, at 34-35 (citing Dirk Johnson, 2 Out of 3 Young Black Men
in Denver Are on Police List of Gang Suspects, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/11/us/2-of-3-young-black-men-in-denver-listed-bypolice-as-suspected-gangsters.html).
197
Id. at 35.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
ALEXANDER, supra note 4, at 133.
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American males in the city.201 Similar lists, which disproportionately
affect young men of color, are kept in cities across the country.202
Furthermore, because state and local agencies often do not update
these databases on a regular basis, once an individual is documented,
his information tends to stay in a database indefinitely.203 Many
individuals do not even know that they are in these databases because
the government is under no obligation to inform them of this fact.204
Another potentially invasive and troubling form of data collection
and aggregation is the use of geolocation and social networking
technology. In 2011, law enforcement agencies in the United States
made more than 1.3 million requests to wireless carriers for their
subscribers’ information.205 Between January and June 2013, they
made 10,918 requests for information from Google and YouTube.206
Google reports that there is a trend of increasing government
surveillance of its sites.207 In the first half of 2012, Twitter received
679 user information requests.208 This was more requests than Twitter
received during the entirety of 2011.209
It is unclear whether the police legally must obtain a warrant in
order to obtain online communications and geolocation data,210 but
201

Id.; Mitnick, supra note 192, at 126.
MILLER, supra note 5, at 35; Mitnick, supra note 192, at 125-26.
203
See Mitnick, supra note 192, at 79, 126.
204
Id.
205
See REP. ZOE LOEFGREN, FACT SHEET ON INTERNET FREEDOM LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE
(Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.lofgren.house.gov/images/user_images/gt/stories/pdf/fact%
20sheet%20for%20ecpa%202.0%20and%20global%20free%20internet%20-%20rep%
20lofgren%20-%20092112.pdf (discussing Representative Loefgren’s introduction of H.R.
6529 and H.R. 6530 to the 112th Cong. (2012)).
206
Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
userdatarequests/countries/?p=2013-06 (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). Google reported
that it complied with these requests either fully or partially 83% of the time. Id.
207
Transparency Report: Government Requests on the Rise, GOOGLE (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/11/transparency-report-government-requests.html.
208
Twitter Transparency Report, TWITTER (July 2, 2012), http://blog.twitter.com/
2012/07/twitter-transparency-report.html. Twitter complied with these requests either
fully or partially 75% of the time. Id.
209
Id.
210
The Third Circuit has held that the Stored Communications Act allows access
to cell site data with an order from a magistrate based on “reasonable grounds to
believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic
Communication Service to Disclose Records to Government, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)). This standard is less than a probable
cause standard. See id. The court did provide, however, that there may be some
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many agencies habitually make warrantless requests for this
information.211 Some police departments have even invested in their
own cell tracking technology.212 There are also cases where the police
have used a person’s Facebook friends to obtain access to that
individual’s personal page, comments, and list of friends.213
Furthermore, a few cities have begun using the Naval Postgraduate
School’s Lighthouse, a computer program that analyzes geographical
and social relationships.214
A few police departments also are considering the use of
surveillance drones,215 but it is no secret that many cities and towns in
the United States already engage in mass surveillance of public spaces
using both private and public video cameras.216 As part of former
Mayor Giuliani’s war on crime, cameras were placed in “Central Park,
subway stations, and numerous ‘high crime’ public housing
projects.”217 Since that time, the number of cameras has increased to
such a degree that anyone who is in a public space in lower Manhattan
right now is likely being watched.218 The same is true with respect to
Times Square.219 The most recent surveillance system in New York

circumstances when a magistrate could require a warrant showing probable cause. Id.
at 319. In United States v. Skinner, the Sixth Circuit determined that the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the geolocation data emitted from his
pay-as-you-go cell phone, and, therefore, the police’s use of that data was not a Fourth
Amendment violation. 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). Various members of
Congress have introduced federal legislation to require warrants for stored electronic
and geolocation data. See, e.g., 2012 ECPA 2.0 Act, H.R. 6529, 112th Cong. (2012). In
November 2012, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved amendments to the 1988
Video Privacy Act and the 1986 Electronic Communication Privacy Act, which would
require the government to obtain a warrant to obtain e-mail communications, social
media postings, and other electronic private data. See H.R. 2471, 112th Cong. (2012).
211
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request,
ACLU (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cellphone-location-tracking-public-records-request.
212
Id.
213
See, e.g., U.S. v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
214
See Erica Goode, With Green Beret Tactics, Combating Gang Warfare, N.Y. TIMES,
May 1, 2012, at A10.
215
Spencer Ackerman, Homeland Security Learns to Love Small Spy Drones,
WIRED.COM (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/roboticaircraft-public-safety/.
216
See Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, supra note 11, at 962
(documenting that “according to a 2006 survey, at least 200 towns and cities in 37
states reported either actual use of video cameras, or plans for their use”).
217
Id. at 961.
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See id. at 961-62.
219
Id. at 962.
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City is the Domain Awareness System, which “aggregates and analyzes
information from approximately 3,000 surveillance cameras around
the city and allows the police to scan license plates, cross-check
criminal databases, measure radiation levels, and more.”220 In
Washington, D.C. the police have plans to consolidate all cameras
owned by city agencies, including the public school system, the public
housing system, and the parks system.221 This consolidation is
estimated to include more than 5,200 cameras.222 Chicago’s system
involves 2,250 cameras, 250 of which have biometric technology.223
Many cameras in these jurisdictions have face recognition software.224
In addition, local law enforcement, state crime labs, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation have created DNA databases of potential
suspects. This practice will probably be on the rise given the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Maryland v. King, which held that it is
constitutional to collect a DNA swab from a person who is arrested for
a serious offense.225 State and national databases are regulated and
typically require a conviction or arrest before someone’s DNA can be
collected.226 Local agencies, however, have taken a broader approach.
Some agencies collect the DNA of innocent victims without telling
them that the samples will be saved for future searches.227 Some collect
samples from low-level offenders in exchange for plea bargains or in
exchange for having charges dropped against them.228 Some agencies
are taking samples “on the mere suspicion of a crime, long before an
arrest, and holding on to it regardless of the outcome. Often detectives
get DNA samples simply by asking suspects for them.”229 Some
secretly collect DNA from discarded trash.230
Further research is needed to explore how pervasive data collection
through geolocation technology and social networks is with respect to
the war on crime and whether there are disproportionate effects on
communities of color.231 Mass surveillance through video cameras
220
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obviously involves citizens other than just poor people of color,
although the focus on public housing sites and “high crime” areas in
some neighborhoods potentially could have disproportionate effects
on poor people of color. Similarly, because poor people of color suffer
disproportionate arrest and stop-and-frisk rates,232 they potentially are
more vulnerable to DNA collection. With respect to those jurisdictions
that collect DNA from victims, poor people of color are also
vulnerable given the fact that they disproportionately are the victims
of violent crime.233
Not only are gang databases problematic because they sometimes
lead to inaccurate data,234 but they are also problematic because they
potentially discourage young African-American and Latino males from
spending much time outside of the home out of the fear that the state
will collect personal information about them, which could then lead to
them being targeted for further surveillance. This chilling effect limits
their mobility and the creation of their life plans. It also means that
their abilities to create robust social capital and to be part of
mainstream political discourse are also limited. Gang databases also
discourage poor men of color from dressing and speaking as they see
fit, since part of the criteria for determining whether someone belongs
in the database is how an individual dresses and whether they use
slang.235 How one dresses and speaks is an important aspect of selfidentity and expression. In addition, gang databases potentially
discourage poor young men of color from associating with one
another out of a fear of guilt by association, which heightens one’s
vulnerability to further surveillance. These types of friendships can be
critical to a young man’s development, self-esteem, and general wellbeing. Furthermore, the fact that gang databases focus mainly on
African-American males expresses that these individuals must be
constantly monitored; they are not worthy of respect and their
viewpoints and identities must be managed and cabined.

disproportionately affect people of color in the United States, but it has been
confirmed that the use of surveillance technologies in Great Britain has
disproportionately affected blacks. See JAY STANLEY & CATHERINE CRUMP, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 12 (2011).
232
See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing the disproportionate number of
drug arrests and snitches in African-American and Latino neighborhoods); supra note
110 and accompanying text.
233
See STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 272.
234
See Wright, supra note 193, at 119-20, 127.
235
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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Data aggregation through geolocation technology and social
networking sites is also problematic. Cell phones have become a
necessity in our society. Indeed, many people, particularly poor
people, do not even own landlines in their homes anymore.236 If
people have to worry about the tracking of their comings and goings
through their cell phones, geolocation technology could have a
chilling effect on their mobility and creation of life plans. In addition,
it could affect their freedom of expression and association if
individuals have to worry about the state having easy access to the
names of whom they are calling. This aggregation of data could also
have a chilling effect on discussions and connections made via social
media sites. Similar chilling effects on self-determination, freedom of
association, and freedom of expression are also implicated with
respect to mass surveillance given the fact that more and more public
spaces are being tracked twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week.237
Some may think it alarmist to consider whether the aggregation of
data through technology will really have such a chilling effect,
especially for innocent individuals who have nothing to hide or for
those who do not even know that the data collection is happening.
The problem is that even innocent conduct can sometimes be
embarrassing or simply politically unpopular. This type of information
could potentially affect one’s job prospects, housing opportunities, and
social relationships if made public. Furthermore, the volume of
information that the state can gather through technology is much
greater than traditional police surveillance techniques. For these
reasons, some anonymity from the state via technology is essential in
order to prevent this type of information from providing opportunities
for state abuse. We should be particularly troubled by the potential
chilling effect that law enforcement practices could have on social
media activity given the fact that it has been shown to be an important
catalyst for political expression and change. Data aggregation also
expresses that the state distrusts that targeted individuals are engaged
in legitimate activity.
Finally, although the DNA samples collected for criminal databases
currently only provide information about the identification of a
particular individual, and not his genetic traits, technology could

236
See Nomaan Merchant & Alan Fram, Landline Phone Use Plummets Among Poor
Households, HUFF. POST (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
04/20/landline-phones-poor-households_n_851802.html.
237
See Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, supra note 11, at 966, 971.
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advance in the future to allow for this type of determination.238 The
state’s access to this type of medical information could allow for wideranging abuse, including discrimination in housing, employment, and
health benefits.
3.

SWAT and No-Knock Entries

The militarization of law enforcement also has led to less respect for
individual privacy, which is most evident in the increased use of
paramilitary police units, most commonly known as Special Weapons
and Tactics (“SWAT”) units.239 Prior to the war on drugs, SWAT
teams were primarily used during highly volatile situations such as
bank robberies or hostage situations.240 Now, however, SWAT teams
are used for routine drug arrests.241 In some jurisdictions, drug
warrants are only served by SWAT teams.242
Under the common law, the police were required to announce
themselves before breaking in the doors of someone’s home.243 The
Supreme Court has held that the “knock and announce” rule is part of
the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.244 One of
the purposes of this rule is to protect “those elements of privacy and
dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance” by the police.245 In
other words, a knock and announce allows a home’s occupants to
gather and present themselves in a modest manner.246 If it is in the

238

See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966-67, 1979 (2013).
See RADLEY BALKO, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDS IN AMERICA
1 (Cato Inst. 2006). President Reagan’s administration persuaded Congress to pass the
Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, which encouraged the Pentagon to
give military weapons, equipment, intelligence, and access to research and military
bases to these agencies to help investigate drug crimes. See id. at 7-8. The Military
Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act created an exception to the Posse Comitatus
Act, which prohibits the use of the military for civilian policing. ALEXANDER, supra
note 4, at 77. The partnership between law enforcement and the military continues,
and “[i]n 1997 alone, the Pentagon handed over more than 1.2 million pieces of
military equipment to local police departments.” BALKO, supra, at 8.
240
See BALKO, supra note 239, at 4.
241
See id.; Nunn, supra note 4, at 404-05.
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See BALKO, supra note 239, at 4.
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See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
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See id.
245
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). The knock and announce rule
also protects “human life and limb, because an unannounced entry may provoke
violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.” Id. It also protects an
arrestee’s property from unnecessary damage. Id.
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See id.
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middle of the night, a knock and announce allows a person to get out
of bed and put on some clothes before the police enter.247
The Court has made it clear, however, that a knock and announce is
not always required by the Fourth Amendment.248 Examples of
situations when this rule may not apply include when there is a risk
that an arrestee may escape, when there is a risk of violence, or when
there is a risk that an arrestee might destroy evidence.249 In addition,
the police are free to apply for a no-knock warrant before making an
arrest.250 The Court requires, however, that the determination as to
whether the knock and announce rule applies must be made on a caseby-case basis.251 In other words, the police or a magistrate cannot
determine that a knock and announce is not necessary simply because
the case involves a drug crime.252 Nevertheless, judges in many states
routinely approve no-knock warrants in drug cases,253 and the police
often execute drug warrants without announcing themselves.254 This
practice is bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court has held that
the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock and
announce requirement.255 For this reason, even if a court determines
that the police should have knocked and announced themselves before
entering someone’s home, any evidence they seized during an
otherwise legal search can still be used against a defendant.256
Yet, even when a court determines that a knock and announce is
required, the time required between the announcement and entry is
quite small. Police typically wait no more than ten or fifteen seconds
before entering a person’s home.257 In United States v. Banks, the
Supreme Court determined that fifteen to twenty seconds after a
knock and announce was potentially enough time for the defendant to
dispose of cocaine, and therefore, the police’s entry within that time
period was reasonable.258 This small amount of time clearly does not
247
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249
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give individuals much of a chance to prepare for a police entry,
especially if they are fast asleep at night. Regardless of this fact, the
police use surprise home entries regularly to arrest low-level drug
suspects, including those who possess small amounts of marijuana.259
What is most troubling about the militarization of drug arrests and
searches, however, is the attitude that it creates among police officers.
The U.S. military routinely conducts training operations with civilian
police departments.260 The indoctrination of military ethos into law
enforcement makes it so that, with respect to drug crimes, the job of
the police is no longer to serve and to protect; instead, their job is to
destroy the enemy.261 Descriptions of the types of slogans on the tshirts that officers wear at SWAT conventions and competitions across
the country are telling. “We don’t do drive-by shootings. We stop.”
and “Operation: Ghetto Storm” are just a couple of examples.262
The tactics that these SWAT units use are similar across
jurisdictions. To seize upon the element of surprise, the police often
wait until late at night or just before dawn to conduct an arrest or
search.263 Often dressed in black, and armed with their assault
weapons and sometimes a no-knock warrant, they break down an
individual’s front door.264 They sometimes use diversionary devices
like flash bang grenades that cause temporary blindness and
deafness.265 Awaking in a stupor, the suspect and his family are pelted
with screaming and guns in their faces.266 If they are lucky, they are in
their pajamas. But it is also quite likely that they are wearing very little
or no clothing.267 There also are likely to be children around,
frightened by the commotion.268 Some home occupants, sleepy and
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confused about what is happening, get in defensive mode and pull out
their own weapons because they mistake the police for illegal
intruders.269 As a result, these raids sometimes lead to deaths.270 Even
barking pets have been killed during some of these raids.271 The risk of
violence created by these surprise entries might be legitimate for the
capture of violent offenders, but the vast majority of these arrests are
conducted on low-level drug offenders with no history of violence.272
As already discussed, the home has traditionally been revered as the
one place where one’s privacy should be respected.273 SWAT invasions,
however, are the epitome of a lack of respect of one’s privacy in the
home. Not only are these surprise attacks on mostly nonviolent, and
often innocent, individuals frightening and dangerous, but they also
deprive residents of the opportunity for modesty and a space for
intimate interactions in their homes. These violations are the highest
form of disrespect because they express that the state has so much
distrust for the individual, it has circumvented the norm of heightened
privacy in the home. Furthermore, if a person cannot engage in selfdetermination, self-expression, and freedom of association in one’s
home, it is hard to imagine where one can engage in such activity. For
this reason, the potential chilling effect of military type invasions of
one’s home could be quite devastating.
4.

Snitching

Another weapon in the war on crime arsenal is the snitch. It is
important to differentiate snitches from law-abiding citizens who
report crime in their communities. A snitch is someone who engages
in crime and then reports criminal activity to the government in order
to obtain lesser punishment or no punishment at all.274 A reduction in
sentencing is particularly enticing for drug defendants because federal
drug charges involve severe mandatory minimum sentences that can
269
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only be reduced by cooperating with the government.275 The U.S.
Sentencing Commission estimates that snitches provided information
in 40% of drug cases that resulted in sentences of ten years or more.276
Snitches also sometimes receive cash.277 Indeed, forfeiture statutes
authorize paying informants a percentage of the value of assets seized
as the result of their tips.278 Non-U.S. citizens can sometimes obtain
visas in exchange for cooperation with the government.279 There are
even “professional” snitches who seek out drug users and dealers in
order to provide tips to the police for cash or even drugs.280
Often, however, the government recruits snitches. The police might
engage in an “informed bluff” where they do not have enough
evidence to indict an individual, but they are still able to use the
evidence that they do have to scare that person into cooperating.281
The police also sometimes engage in illegal behavior in order to
recruit a snitch.282 They will target a particular individual and wait
until he is suspected of possessing illegal contraband.283 The police
then “arrest” the individual based on what is usually an illegal search
or seizure.284 Fearful of going to jail, the individual agrees to
cooperate.285 In local and state systems, the deal may be either oral or
written; the Federal Bureau of Investigation requires that all informant
agreements be in writing.286 An informant may help out with one
particular case or with several cases; the state may also use him to
“[keep] feelers” out in a particular community.287 Snitches put back on
the street often are permitted to continue to commit serious crimes
with impunity.288 A disturbing trend involves the recruitment of
teenagers as criminal informants, which “often involves risks that are
incommensurate with the charges that they are facing.”289 Indeed,
275
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because they lack training, experience, and maturity, the use of these
children, sometimes as young as fourteen or fifteen, often has led to
their brutal deaths.290
Sometimes prosecutors will incentivize an individual to become a
snitch by agreeing to lessen or drop criminal charges against a family
member.291 Or, if a family member has better access to information
that a prosecutor wants, the prosecutor might allow the family
member to act as the snitch in order to work off the individual’s
charges.292
Because drug arrests disproportionately affect African-Americans
and Latinos, there are a disproportionate number of snitches in their
neighborhoods as “criminal offenders actively [seek] information in
order to ‘work off’ their own charges.”293 In addition, the use of
teenage snitches disproportionately occurs in poor African-American
and Latino communities.294 One study found that African-American
and Latino neighborhoods were disproportionately the target of bad
search warrants in San Diego, 80% of which relied upon snitches.295
Many bad searches are in the form of intrusive SWAT and no-knock
entries.296 The reasons that snitches have become such a powerful tool,
however, is because of the prevalent practice of overcharging. As will
be discussed in the next section, overcharging allows prosecutors to
scare suspects into cooperating through snitching in order to avoid
hefty sentences.297
The use of snitching instills the realistic fear that one’s neighbors,
family members, or friends might be spying on him. Snitching,
therefore, potentially chills freedom of expression and association
because individuals do not know whom they can trust with knowledge
about their thoughts, feelings, and conduct. Anything they say or do
290
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family suspected that a young mother of two was killed because of her work as a
confidential informant).
291
See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 22.
292
See id.
293
Id. at 5.
294
See Stillman, supra note 289, at 4.
295
See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 5.
296
See BALKO, supra note 239, at 21.
297
See infra Part II.B.5.

1578

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:1539

might later be used against them by the state. Indeed, snitches increase
the access that the state has to an individual’s private information
because they supplement the limited resources the state typically has
to monitor its citizens. The harms caused by snitching are heightened
by the fact that a snitch might be a family member.298 Snitching is
another way that poor people of color feel mistrust and suspicion from
the government. Furthermore, creating an atmosphere where
individuals mistrust members of their own household expresses
complete contempt for the privacy of poor people of color, since
privacy in the home is supposed to be highly valued.
5.

Overcharging and Harsh Sentences

One of the most startling results of the war on crime is the
exponential growth in arrest and incarceration rates, especially of
African-Americans.299 In fact, “[i]f jail inmates are included, per capita
black incarceration is 80 percent higher than the rate at which Stalin’s
regime banished its subjects to the Gulag’s many camps.”300 Nearly
60% of all incarcerated drug offenders are African-American, and
African-Americans and Latinos comprise nearly 75% of drug offenders
in state prisons.301 In many major cities as many as 80% of young
African-American men have criminal records.302 As a result, the vast
majority of individuals of color in poor urban neighborhoods have
family members who are a part of the criminal justice system, either as
prisoners or parolees.303
While the war on drugs is one cause of the increase in arrest and
imprisonment rates, the chief cause is an increase in the number of
individuals charged and convicted of crimes.304 A common practice is
to charge an individual with as many crimes as possible in order to
nudge, or even coerce, a defendant into a plea agreement.305 The more
charges levied against a defendant, the higher his potential sentence
298
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is.306 Moreover, harsh sentences that are attached to certain crimes
because of mandatory minimum and three-strikes laws also create an
incentive for a defendant to plea bargain.307 When prosecutors file
these charges, they know full well that they do not desire to convict
these defendants with the vast majority of these crimes nor do they
seek such high levels of punishment.308 If a defendant believes that he
could be subject to death or a long prison sentence, however, he will
often be more willing to plead guilty to the crime and sentence that is
the actual goal of the prosecutor.309 This practice of overcharging to
induce guilty pleas is aided by the fact that, as part of the political war
on crime over the last few decades,310 state and federal legislators have
both increased the number of crimes on the books and broadened the
liability of criminal defendants under various crimes that already
existed.311 First, they have increased the number of overlapping
crimes, which enable a prosecutor to charge a defendant with multiple
crimes for the same conduct.312 In addition, they have redefined
criminal offenses in such a way that less serious conduct is
criminalized more severely now than it was in the past.313 As a result,
the guilty plea rate in felony cases is now 96%.314
306
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Overcharging and harsh sentencing make inner-city residents more
vulnerable to privacy invasions. They have exponentially increased the
number of individuals who are labeled as “criminal,” including
innocent people convicted based on pressured plea deals.315 Once a
person has this stigma, the police feel even more entitled to engage in
stops-and-frisks, motor stops, data collection, SWAT invasions, and
perpetual surveillance and harassment of him.316 Harsh sentencing and
overcharging also encourage snitching, which, as already has been
discussed, is a privacy invasion in and of itself.
***
Each of the tactics I have described in this Part is troubling in its
own right. Yet, many individuals, particularly poor, young urban
males of color, endure many of them simultaneously. They endure
constant stops-and-frisks, which could potentially lead to their
personal information being placed in a gang database. They might also
have to provide a DNA swab in order to terminate their encounters
with the police. Law enforcement might track them further through
their cell phones and social networking pages. Due to oppressive
overcharging policies regarding minor offenses, they are in more
danger of being convicted of crimes, which also leads to heightened
surveillance. Even if a young man of color avoids a conviction, he still
has to worry about a close friend or neighbor snitching on him so that
he might avoid his own potentially hefty sentence. As already
described, the aggregation of these forms of monitoring by the state
have the potential for substantial chilling effects on activities we
typically value in our democratic society, and they also create serious
dignitary harms.
III. IN SEARCH OF A BETTER APPROACH
Thus far this Article has critiqued the privacy invasions experienced
under the war on crime on moral grounds. In this Part, I will further
argue that they cannot even be supported on utilitarian grounds. It
cannot be denied that crime is a serious problem in poor urban
communities of color. Indeed, the level of violence in these
communities is staggering and disturbing. In 2006, the murder rate for
whites was 3 per 100,000; for African-Americans, it was 24.317
315
316
317
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Furthermore, although I am critiquing the war on crime, I certainly do
still believe that the state, and law enforcement in particular, has an
important role in reducing the level of violence in these communities.
Many poor people of color share this sentiment particularly because
their victimization has historically been ignored by the police.318
According to liberal theorists, the state may limit an individual’s
rights to the extent that those rights infringe upon the rights or
security of other members of society.319 If one’s privacy threatens a
community to an excessive degree, therefore, liberal principles suggest
that it is acceptable for the state to curb that privacy. One might argue
that a decrease in crime, and particularly in violence, is worth some
loss of individual privacy.320 Furthermore, while criminal justice
policies disproportionately affect poor urban people of color, the fact
is that they are the ones who are the most victimized by violent
crime.321 For these reasons, theoretically, these individuals should be
willing to experience less privacy than their middle-class and white
counterparts, if this loss means that their streets can be safer.322
The problem with this line of argument in this context, however, is
that many of the tactics discussed in this Article severely violate
individual privacy rights,323 but many do not appear to be all that
effective in combatting crime.324 It has been documented that the high
number of street and traffic stops conducted by law enforcement
across the country yield low results. Eighty-five percent of
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documented stops-and-frisks conducted in New York are on AfricanAmericans and Latinos.325 Yet, the police confiscate weapons and
contraband in only 1.14% of these stops.326 Furthermore, it is
estimated that 95% of motor stops conducted through Operation
Pipeline stops yield no illegal drugs.327 One study found that up to
99% of traffic stops result in no citation; 98% of searches were based
on the consent of the driver with no other legal justification for the
search.328 Moreover, data consistently show that the success rates for
finding contraband during the stops-and-frisks of whites are higher
than those for stops-and-frisks of African-Americans.329 In other
words, the disproportionate number of stops-and-frisks of AfricanAmericans is inefficient. The inefficiency of these stops is not
surprising given the subjective and contradictory drug courier profiles
that law enforcement officers use in determining whom to search:
The profile can include . . . driving an expensive car, driving a
car that needs repairs, driving with out-of-state license plates,
driving a rental car, driving with “mismatched occupants”
acting too calm, acting too nervous, dressing casually, [and]
wearing expensive clothing or jewelry . . . .330
On the Los Angeles Police Department’s website, it is noted that
wearing the color green can mean either that the “gang member” is
declaring neutrality for the moment or is a drug dealer.331 As a result
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of these broad criteria, the police really have an excuse to stop anyone
they please, including those who fit certain racial or ethnic
stereotypes.332
The fact that gang databases are also based on highly subjective
criteria, including racial and ethnic stereotypes,333 suggests that they
also are probably unreliable. Furthermore, some of the information
that is collected in the databases is based on self-reporting, which is
also unreliable because poor urban youths often claim to be a member
of a gang in order to protect themselves or to make themselves seem
tougher and more important.334 As already mentioned, these databases
are rarely updated,335 which also increases their unreliability. For these
reasons, studies have shown that gang databases tend to be of little
value.336
With respect to snitching, one of the chief criticisms of this practice
is that snitches are often unreliable.337 A person who is facing a hefty
jail sentence may be more than willing to point his finger in another
direction in order to reduce his own sentence.338 Moreover, a person
with few material resources or a serious drug habit is also willing to
give the police a few names in order to score some extra cash or
drugs.339 Lying snitches lead to mistaken SWAT invasions, which
sometimes end in death.340 They also lead to the conviction of the
innocent, either because juries believe their false stories or because
innocent defendants plead guilty because they fear that the jury will
believe the false stories.341 Studies show that twenty-one to 50% of
wrongful capital convictions were based on false informant
testimony.342
Furthermore, because the drug war in particular is a numbers game,
the best snitches often are the most dangerous actors at the highest
level of a drug operation, not the lowest level and least violent
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actors.343 These individuals tend to have the most information in terms
of how a particular drug ring operates, who is involved in that drug
ring, and who the drug users are.344 As a result, they are able to give
the police a higher number of names than those at the lower end of
the totem pole.345 Moreover, asset forfeiture provisions favor the big
kingpins who can essentially buy their freedom by offering a share of
drug profits in exchange for leniency.346 This is the reason that low
level, nonviolent drug offenders and drug users tend to go to jail and
not the violent kingpins.347 Indeed, 80% of drug arrests are for
possession, not for sales, and 80% of the growth of drug arrests in the
1990s was for marijuana possession.348 Focusing on nonviolent users
of marijuana surely will not curb the violence in inner cities, which is
purportedly one of the aims of the war on drugs.
One might argue that getting any drug dealer off of the street, no
matter his level in a drug organization, makes neighborhoods safer.
Yet, the reality is that when one dealer goes to jail, he makes room for
the next dealer to take his place.349 In addition, when law enforcement
breaks up one drug ring, the market in a particular neighborhood
destabilizes, which leads to turf wars and increased violence.350 As a
result, scholars scathingly note that we now have a criminal justice
system of high quantity with low quality.351 In other words,
overcharging and harsh sentencing have led to higher arrest and
imprisonment rates, but this increase has not led to a proportionate
decrease in violent crime.352
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Respecting individual privacy, however, could actually help make
the criminal justice system become more effective in combatting
crime. Social science research suggests that individuals are more apt to
follow the law and to respect law enforcement officers when they feel
that they have been treated fairly and respectfully.353 For this reason, if
the state begins to acknowledge the personhood of residents in poor,
urban communities of color by decreasing the overwhelming feeling of
being constantly watched, these residents could become more law
abiding. They also could become more cooperative in helping the
police target those individuals who actually are posing the most
danger to the community.354 Furthermore, if individuals no longer feel
like the state is “occupy[ing] and preoccupy[ing]”355 their
neighborhoods through oppressive surveillance, they will have more
freedom of expression and association. This greater freedom will
encourage strong friendships and networks within the community,
which are also characteristic of neighborhoods with reduced rates of
crime and violence.356 For these reasons, criminal justice policies that
enhance privacy can lead to a more positive and effective dynamic
between the state and the individuals in these communities; this type
of dynamic could ultimately lead to a more effective criminal justice
system.
One could argue that it is the violence in these neighborhoods, and
not the criminal justice tactics discussed in this Article, that is
undermining the creation of informal social networks in these
neighborhoods. If one is afraid she is going to be shot, that fear will
certainly inhibit her willingness to leave her home and socialize with
353
See Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, supra note 17, at 47; Tracey L.
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 213
(1998); see also Sundby, supra note 106, at 1778 (“When . . . distrust occurs, the
disenchanted group will view the government as illegitimate and be inclined to look to
means outside the formal political process to have its voice heard.”).
354
See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 263-67
(2008). Indeed, the use of snitching has actually undermined relations between the
community and the police and led to a “stop snitching” movement that has sometimes
led to retaliation and violence. See NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 121-38.
355
Rubenfeld, supra note 96, at 784 (defining privacy as “the fundamental freedom
not to have one’s life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing
state”).
356
See Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593,
1602-08 (2002); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1285-88 (2004); Deborah M.
Weissman & Marsha Weissman, The Moral Politics of Social Control: Political Culture
and Ordinary Crime in Cuba, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 311, 362-64 (2010).

1586

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:1539

her neighbors. Obviously more than access to privacy is needed to
address violent crime. Yet as has already been discussed, many policies
that deprive individuals of privacy do not seem that effective in
curbing violence. Since privacy is an important tool in fostering the
types of informal networks that are present in neighborhoods with low
crime rates, these policies instead appear to be counterproductive.
It cannot be denied that there is a dark side to privacy, however.
While privacy allows access to greater freedoms, it also can be a means
for hiding oppression. Indeed, radical feminists have argued that we
should “explode the private,” because privacy historically was used as
a shield for batterers and rapists from state intervention.357 Bennett
Capers has argued that cameras in public spaces have the potential of
deterring crime, unveiling police brutality and racial profiling, and
preventing wrongful convictions.358 DNA databases also have the
potential of preventing wrongful convictions.359 These arguments are
particularly compelling given the fact that crime in poor communities
of color is often under-enforced360 and that there are high numbers of
individuals who are wrongfully convicted.361
I am not advocating, therefore, for a wholesale removal of video
surveillance, DNA databases, and any of the other tactics discussed in
this Article. Instead, I want to highlight the privacy invasions that
extreme forms of these tactics create and the role that these invasions
play in the state’s subordination of its citizens. These harms should be
balanced against their law enforcement value. A complete analysis of
this balancing is beyond the scope of this Article,362 but given the
importance of privacy, these harms should be taken quite seriously
and not simply dismissed in the name of crime prevention.
Some legal actors have already begun taking steps to restore the
dignity and privacy of citizens disproportionately affected by the war
on crime. In the Bronx, the district attorney’s office no longer
prosecutes residents of housing projects who were arrested for
trespassing unless an attorney from the office first determines that
there is a legitimate basis for pressing charges, based on an interview
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with the police officer who made the initial arrest.363 If adopted by
other jurisdictions, this type of practice ideally will limit the amount
of harassment these residents must endure to prove that they have a
right to be in and around their own homes. Furthermore, a Brooklyn
judge recently declared that he will dismiss any public intoxication
case brought before him unless the police officer who made the arrest
can prove, in a manner other than by a sniff, that the open container
actually contained alcohol.364 Concerned that the city’s public drinking
law is being disproportionately enforced against African-Americans
and Latinos, Judge Noach Dear hoped that his ruling would encourage
the New York Police Department to “reconsider its enforcement of the
ordinance.”365 If more judges took similar types of actions, the police
would have less incentive to harass residents with frequent Terry, and
even illegal, stops in the hopes of adding to their tallies of arrests.
The “it takes a lot of frogs”366 mentality must cease. Criminal justice
success needs to be measured in ways other than high arrest and
prosecution rates.367 When the police and prosecutors focus so much
on numbers, privacy goes to the wayside. Law enforcement agencies
need to find innovative policies that actually reduce violence and
crime, but that do not undermine individual privacy. For example,
assigning specific police officers to public housing sites on a
permanent basis, so that they can really get to know residents in a
personal way, could be a better practice in combatting crime than the
common practice of simply harassing every person who attempts to
enter a building. It is time to create policies that incentivize high
quality, not high quantity criminal justice where police officers must
articulate more concrete reasons for their privacy invasions than just
“furtive movement” or minor violations.368 Furthermore, police
363
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365
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366
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officers need to become more conscious of the implicit racial biases
that we all share369 during their interactions with poor citizens of
color.370
Although this Article focuses on the aggregate effect of the war on
crime on poor people of color, all citizens should be concerned about
this phenomenon not just as a matter of racial and socioeconomic
justice, but also because the tactics I discuss are a potential threat to
everyone. Indeed, poor people of color appear to be the canary in the
mine. Surely some, if not most, of the 1.3 million wireless services
subscribers whom the police targeted in 2011 were neither poor nor of
color. In addition, “although whites are underrepresented as drug
offenders, the percentage of offenders who are white has risen since
1999, and the percentage of offenders who are African-American has
declined.”371 There are a rising number of whites who are serving
mandatory sentences for methamphetamine abuse.372 In addition, the
practice of overcharging and harsh sentencing is not limited to the war
on drugs. Prosecutions of all crimes, including those with offenders
who are mostly white, have increased as part of the war on crime.373
Specifically, offenders of sexually explicit material offenses tend to be
middle-aged white men; these prosecutions have risen by more than
400% since 1996.374 Finally, everyone is a potential target of mass
surveillance and DNA databases.
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CONCLUSION
The war on crime has a racialized history, and scholars have
documented the various ways that it has had subordinating effects on
poor urban people of color.375 This Article contributes to this account
by arguing that privacy makes one less vulnerable to oppressive state
subordination and social control. In the aggregate, the privacy
invasions caused by stops-and-frisks, motor stops, SWAT invasions,
snitching, and data aggregation through technology inhibit selfdetermination, self-expression, and freedom of association.
Overcharging and harsh sentencing make individuals even more
vulnerable to these privacy invasions. As a result, poor people of color
are obstructed in the creation of life plans, are left out of mainstream
political discourse, and have limited access to social capital. These
tactics also send the message that poor people of color cannot be
trusted to engage in legitimate activities and that the state disrespects
them and values their identities and viewpoints less than those of
white and wealthier individuals. Both of these messages result in
dignitary harms.
While these tactics purport to combat crime, they entail privacy
invasions that discourage law-abiding behavior and stymy the creation
of the strong relationships and networks that are characteristic of
neighborhoods with low crime rates. For these reasons, the criminal
justice system’s assault on poor people of color’s privacy simply
cannot be justified. Furthermore, poor people of color are the canary
in the mine. Whites are now also experiencing serious privacy
invasions. For this reason, everyone has a stake in this matter because
these policies have deep implications for how the line ultimately will
be drawn between all individuals and the state in the criminal justice
context and beyond.
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